From the Introduction
In this paper, I will attempt to reconcile Immanuel Kant’s claim that, in order to survive, humans have to believe in progress despite all empirical evidence to the contrary and Immanuel Levinas’s claim that after Auschwitz we can no longer believe in a “Happy Ending.” This contradiction has led to a surprisingly common morally nihilistic response to the evils of the world: “I don’t want to hear/see that. It only depresses me.” By analyzing this response, we see that we need some sort of belief in progress in order to survive, but at the same time this belief is unreasonable. I will, therefore, argue that in order to reconcile this contradiction and also avoid moral nihilism, we cannot believe in progress, yet insofar as it allows us to respond to the evils in the world, we must function as if progress exists.

From the Introduction
We are obsessed with Hamlet’s “To be or not to be” monologue (Hamlet, 3.1.58-92), and yet, we have more questions about it than Hamlet asks in it. For example, is it a melancholy monologue in which Hamlet toys with suicide or a show for his audience’s sake? Is he aware of Ophelia’s presence, of Polonius’ and Claudius’? The answers to these questions depend on our interpretation of the previous scene, of what leads Hamlet to make the speech. I will argue that Hamlet is necessarily aware of an audience, and is speaking for them, by showing that Hamlet’s main turn in the play does not occur in scene 3.4 (as is generally assumed), but rather in 2.2.
Note: The second question in the title is an allusion to a conversation in the class for which the paper was written. Hopefully, it won't cause any unnecessary confusion.

From the Introduction
Haig Khatchadourian and Robert Richman both present arguments disagreeing with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s use of the word “family resemblance” as taken in an anti-essentialist context. I will argue that, though both articles help us to understand Wittgenstein’s term and even to expand its use, Khatchadourian fails to correctly use the tools for finding a family resemblance, and Richman fails to distinguish different senses of the same word (as Wittgenstein does in The Blue Book). And therefore, an anti-essentialist argument based on family resemblances is still possible. I will also argue, however, that such an argument does not come from Wittgenstein or follow necessarily from his claims.

From the Introduction
1) In my broader (less ambitious) claim, I am not arguing that the scientific answers for questions are better than literary or philosophical answers, or even that there are potentially adequate scientific answers to all important questions, only that it is presumptuous to assume that literature (or, only poetry, as for Heidegger) and philosophy provide us with answers either to questions that science cannot answer or that are more meaningful than any answer science could give. This claim does not disagree with Nussbaum's urge to include literature in the quest for understanding. It makes no claim upon the valuableness of literature or philosophy as ways of approaching truth. It does, however, disagree with Nussbaum's claim that literature, by dealing with particular situations, is the most adequate way to answer some questions about understanding.
2) In my narrower (more ambitious) claim, I am arguing that if – in fact – scientific answers can be adequate to deal with all interesting questions, a purely scientific mode of life is worth living, and – because scientific answers have more predictive power than other sorts of answers – a purely scientific mode of life is, in some cases, a better life than any alternative.
I will attempt to prove these claims (or approach them at least) by arguing against claims by Nussbaum and Heidegger that science necessarily cannot adequately answer all of our questions. But, first, I will try to make clear what Nussbaum and Heidegger mean by science (so that I do not only argue against their uses of a particular term).